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Abstract. Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the
evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can
be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector,
while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes
are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained
unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for
mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study
their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We
find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined
to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot
be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their
cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by
leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical
analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only
choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between
cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection
can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different
migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework
of spatially social games.
Keywords: individual migration, orientation-driven migration, public goods, coopera-
tion, evolutionary dynamics
1. Introduction
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals has been
a puzzling phenomenon in nature and human societies [1]. Over the past decades,
evolutionary game theory has provided a very competent framework for studying the
evolution of cooperative behavior [2–5]. In particular, the public goods game has
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2been recognized as a paradigm, which succinctly describes the essential dilemma of
cooperation [2, 6]. Recent works on the public goods game have proposed effective
means to enable the evolution of cooperation, such as punishment [7–13], reward [14–16],
exclusion [17–20], and individual migration [21].
Individual migration is an essential characteristic of living organisms [22]. It has
been demonstrated that the mode of individual mobility does influence the evolutionary
dynamics of cooperation among unrelated individuals, which has attracted intensive
research activity in recent years [23–39]. Theoretical and experimental studies have
shown that individual mobility can promote the evolution of cooperation [40–59]. In
particular, Meloni et al. considered random migration for individuals playing the
prisoner’s dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane and found that cooperation
can be maintained when the moving velocity of individuals is not too high [28].
Subsequently, Cardillo et al. [40] found that in the public goods game, played on a two-
dimensional plane, low mobility promotes cooperation, whereas high velocity can disrupt
cooperation. What is more, Helbing and Yu [27] proposed success-driven migration
under which individuals move to the location which is surrounded by cooperators in
the prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice and demonstrated that such mode
of migration leads to the outbreak of cooperation. On the other hand, Chen et al.
proposed risk-driven migration in the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square
lattice and found that risk-driven migration dramatically enhances the evolution of
public cooperation when individuals move away from unfavorable locations [41].
It is worth pointing out that most of previous works consider random migration
[28, 40], success-driven migration [27], or risk-driven migration [41] separately. They
do not consider the orientation-driven migration under which different migration
preferences or migration modes are considered in a unified framework. Indeed
individuals can adjust their moving orientation according to these preferred modes.
By means of migration they can move away from unfavorable environment, pursuit the
profitable circumstances, or choose other directions as they wish in realistic situations.
However, it is still unclear how such orientation-driven migration influences the evolution
of cooperation and which mode of individual migration can promote the evolution of
cooperation more effectively.
In this work, we thereby propose an orientation-driven migration into a population
of mobile individuals playing the public goods game. We assume that individuals can
choose the direction of mobility depending on the strategy types of their neighbors
on a two-dimensional plane under such orientation-driven migration. Correspondingly,
individuals can choose to escape from neighboring defectors or move to neighboring
cooperators according to the settings of orientation parameters. By means of Monte
Carlo simulations and numerical calculations, we show that cooperation can be best
maintained when individuals choose to escape from neighboring defectors, when the
mobility velocity is not too high. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be promoted
when individuals are more inclined to move to neighboring cooperators. Furthermore,
compared with random migration, we find that escaping from neighboring defectors can
3better promote the evolution of cooperation.
2. Model
In our model, we consider a population of N individuals who play the public goods game
on a two-dimensional plane of linear size L with periodic boundary conditions. Hence,
the density of individuals is defined as ρ = N/L2. Each individual is described via
position and velocity vectors on the two-dimensional plane. Initially each individual
is distributed at random in the plane via using two independent random variables
from [0, L] interval, and correspondingly individual i’s initial position is assigned as
ri(0) = [xi(0), yi(0)].
Once the initial configuration of the system is set, two dynamical processes coevolve:
orientation-driven migration and strategy evolution. By adopting Ref. [60], at every time
step we assume that each individual i moves with a constant speed v and its position
ri(t) = [xi(t), yi(t)] and velocity are updated by means of the following equations
ri(t+ 1) = ri(t) + vi(t+ 1), (1)
vi(t+ 1) = vv̂i(t), (2)
where we used ∆t = 1 and v̂i(t) is a unit vector which is determined by the following
equation
vi(t) = ηf̂
(CD)
i (t) + µgi(t). (3)
The first term in the right side of Eq. (3) describes the orientation-driven force
for individual i by strategy distribution among the neighbors, and η quantifies its
relative strength. For simplicity without loss of generality, η is set to one in this study.
Furthermore, we assume that
f
(CD)
i = (1− β)f̂ (C)i + β f̂ (D)i , (4)
where
f
(C)
i = −
∑
j∈S(C)i
h(rij)r̂ij (5)
and
f
(D)
i =
∑
j∈S(D)i
h(rij)r̂ij. (6)
Here the sum of Eq. (5) [Eq. (6)] is over individual i’s neighboring cooperators (defectors)
j who are within an Euclidean distance less than the threshold distance of interaction
R that is,
√
[xi(t)− xj(t)]2 + [yi(t)− yj(t)]2 ≤ R. Here h(r) is a weight function and
is set as r−w, where w > 1 in agreement with Ref. [60]. Notably, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is a
key parameter of our model characterizing the relative weight between the two extreme
motivation attitudes. For β = 0, individual i concentrates to go closer to neighboring
4cooperators. Whereas for β = 1, individual i focuses exclusively to escape away from
neighboring defectors.
The second term in the right side of Eq. (3) describes a steric repulsive force, so
that individual overlap can be prevented. The related µ parameter quantifies its relative
strength on vi(t). We consider that
gi =
∑
j∈S(rep.)i
g(ri − rj), (7)
where the sum is over neighbors within a sphere of radius R surrounding individual i.
In agreement with Ref. [60] the function g is set as
g(r) =
r̂
1 + exp[(r − rf )/σ] , (8)
where r = |̂r|, rf describes the length scale of repulsion, and σ describes the steepness.
The second ingredient of our dynamical model is the evolutionary public goods game
played by mobile individuals. Initially an individual i is designated as a cooperator
[si(0) = 1] or a defector [si(0) = 0] with equal probability. At each time step, we
consider that the neighborhood of a given individual i is made up by all the individuals
j who are within an Euclidean distance less than the threshold distance of interaction
R [61]. In other words, when
√
[xi(t)− xj(t)]2 + [yi(t)− yj(t)]2 ≤ R, individuals i
and j are connected at time step t and we have Aij(t) = 1, otherwise Aij(t) = 0 in
the adjacency matrix A(t). Evidently, we have Aii = 0. Importantly, individual i
whose number of neighbors is ni does not only play a single public goods game with
all its corresponding neighbors, but also plays the public goods games in alternative
groups where its neighbors are the focal players. In a public goods game where
individual i participates in, each cooperator contributes the same cost c (c is set to
1 in this study without loss of generality), while each defector contributes nothing. The
total contribution from cooperators is multiplied by a multiplication factor r and then
distributed equally among all group members independently of their strategies, hence
the total payoff of individual i at time step t is given by
Pi(t) =
N∑
j=1
[Aij(t) + δij]
N∑
k=1
[Ajk(t) + δjk]sk(t)cr
nj(t) + 1
− [ni(t) + 1]si(t)c, (9)
where δij = 1 if i = j, otherwise δij = 0.
After each round, each individual i has a chance to imitate the strategy of a
randomly chosen neighbor j. If Pj(t) < Pi(t), no update occurs. Otherwise, the strategy
transfer occurs with the probability
q =
Pj(t)− Pi(t)
M
, (10)
where M ensures the proper normalization and is given by the maximum possible
difference between the total payoffs of individuals i and j [5]. We note that this strategy
update rule is also known as discrete replicator rule [62].
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Figure 1. Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the speed v for random migration
and orientation-driven migration with different values of β. Parameters: µ = 1 and
R = 1.
We emphasize that during the evolutionary process, there exist complicated
coupling effects between the evolutionary dynamics of individuals’ motions and
strategies. In particular, individuals’ motion can change the interaction structures of
the mobile population, which can also influence the strategy evolution in the population.
On the other hand, individuals’ strategy updates can also have consequences on how
neighboring players move. We correspondingly study this coevolutionary model by
means of Monte Carlo simulations. Simulations are carried out in a population with
size N = 1000. As the key quantity, the fraction of cooperators is defined as the density
of cooperators in the whole population. We are interested in concentrating on how
the mobility speed v, the orientation-driven weight β, the strength of steric repulsive
force u, and the threshold distance R influence the fraction of cooperators, in order to
clearly explore the effects of our proposed orientation-driven migration on the evolution
of cooperation. To do that, we set r = 5.75, ρ = 2, rf = 0.2, σ = 0.1, and w = 2 for
simplicity. We find that our main results remain valid when these parameter values are
changed. In addition, when the above described updating rules are applied, the mobile
population may converge to one of the two possible absorbing states, which are full
cooperation or full defection. To gain representative behavior we run 200 independent
realizations for each set of parameter values and compute the fraction of times that the
population evolves to full cooperation. Alternatively, if the population does not converge
to an absorbing state after 106 updates, then the cooperation level is determined in the
stationary state by averaging the fraction of cooperators in the population over the last
104 updates.
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Figure 2. Fraction of cooperators as a function of the orientation-driven weight β for
different values of speed v. Dashed line are used to indicate the fractions of cooperators
for random migration at these speed values, i.e., black (v = 0.01), red (v = 0.03), blue
(v = 0.05), green (v = 0.07), and purple (v = 0.1). Parameters: R = 1 and µ = 1.
3. Results
We first present the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the mobility speed v for
different values of the orientation-driven weight β, as shown in Fig. 1. We find that for
each value of β the fraction of cooperators decreases with increasing the speed v, but
cooperators can flourish for low values of v. In particular, the highest level of cooperation
can be reached for large values of β. For the sake of comparison, we also show the fraction
of cooperators as a function of the mobility speed v for random migration in Fig. 1. We
find that when the speed is not high, the fraction of cooperators for orientation-driven
migration with large β is always higher than that for random migration. In addition,
note that the cooperation level for β = 0.5 is close to that obtained for random migration
when the same value of speed v is applied. This may be because the case of β = 0.5
corresponds to a situation where attraction by cooperators has the same strength to the
aversion to defectors, which approaches the case of random migration in which diffusion
is independent of strategies of neighboring players [42].
In order to qualify the effect of orientation-driven weight β on the evolution of
cooperation in detail, we further show the fraction of cooperators as a function of β for
different values of v, as shown in Fig. 2. We find that for each value of v the fraction
of cooperators increases gradually as the value of β increases. Notably, full cooperation
can be reached for large β, especially when the mobility speed is low. For small β
values, however, the cooperation promoting effect is moderate even at low mobility
speed. In addition, Fig. 2 shows the comparison of random migration case with the
orientation-driven cases obtained at different speed values. We can see that for each
value of v, there exists a critical value of β, above which orientation-driven migration
can better promote cooperation than random migration. These results indicate that
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Figure 3. First four columns depict the time evolution of spatial patterns for random
migration and orientation-driven migration with three different values of β. Here
blue color represents cooperator while red color marks defector players. The fifth
column depicts how the average number of individual’s neighbors change in time in
the mentioned cases. Here, kCC (kCD ) denotes the average number of neighboring
cooperators (defectors) around cooperator players, while kDC (kDD ) marks the average
number of neighboring cooperators (defectors) of defector players. We define here
kDC = 0 and kDD = 0 when there are no defectors in the population, whereas kCC = 0
and kCD = 0 mean that there are no cooperators in the population. Parameters are
v = 0.1, R = 1, and µ = 1.
when individuals are more inclined to escape away from defectors in their interactive
neighborhoods, the evolution of cooperation can be promoted. In particular, cooperation
can be best promoted when individuals concentrate exclusively to escape away from their
neighboring defectors. On the contrast, the evolution of cooperation is not supported
when individuals are focusing to move close to cooperators in their neighbors.
In order to gain deeper insight about the effects of orientation-driven movement on
the evolution of cooperation, we present a series of snapshots of strategy evolution
about the microscopic process for three representative values of β in Fig. 3. For
the sake of comparison, we also plot the typical snapshots of strategy evolution for
8random migration here. Meanwhile, we further illustrate how the average number of
a cooperator’s or defector’s neighboring cooperators or defectors changes in time for
these different cases, as presented in the rightmost column of Fig. 3. We can see that
for random migration (top row), widespread cooperative patches occur in the mobile
population at the early stage of evolution. With the invasion of defectors, then several
isolated cooperators and tiny separated cooperator formations are found in the two-
dimensional plane. We can also find that with the decrease of the number of cooperators
in the population, the average numbers of neighboring cooperators and defectors
of cooperators both decrease during this period of evolution. Finally, cooperators
will disappear and instead defectors will dominate the whole population. When the
orientation-driven migration is considered, we can find that for β = 0 (second row),
although cooperators move towards to neighboring cooperators, meanwhile defectors
also move towards to neighboring cooperators. Due to the evolutionary advantage
of defectors to cooperators and such kind of orientation-driven migration for moving
close to cooperators, the average number of neighboring cooperators of cooperators
decreases, while the average number of neighboring defectors of cooperators increases
during the period of evolution. Correspondingly, cooperators’ clusters cannot be formed,
and cooperators will disappear soon in the population. While for β = 0.5 (third row),
on one hand individuals will consider to move close to their neighboring cooperators,
on the other hand they will consider to escape away from their neighboring defectors.
Correspondingly, during the evolutionary process a cooperators’ cluster can be gradually
formed from widespread cooperative patches. However, the cluster size is not large
enough, so it cannot resist the invasion of defectors successfully. During this period of
evolution, we can see that the average number of neighboring cooperators of cooperators
can first increase, but with the invasion of defectors it will decrease then. Meanwhile
the average number of neighboring defectors of cooperators increases. Subsequently,
the cooperators’ cluster will shrink, and finally disappear. For β = 1 (bottom row),
individuals concentrate to escape away from their neighboring defectors. We can
find that a single large compact cluster of cooperators can be formed from numerous
cooperators patches in the two-dimensional plane. Correspondingly, the average number
of neighboring cooperators of cooperator players can increase, while the average number
of neighboring defectors of cooperator agents decreases during the period of evolution.
Consequently, this compact cluster can not just resist the invasion of defectors, but it
can also grow and expand. As a result, cooperation will finally prevail in the whole
population.
The comparison of time evolution in the fifth column highlights that kDD always
grows first due to the successful imitation of defector strategy in the mixed initial state.
But this effect is weakened significantly at a large β value where players (including
cooperators) are motivated to escape from the vicinity of defectors. Consequently, this
is the only case where kCD decays in time, hence defectors are not fed anymore by
neighboring cooperators. This explains the striking difference between the outcomes of
plotted cases.
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Figure 4. Panel (a) shows the average distance between cooperators and defectors
as a function of time calculated among neighboring players for β = 0 and β = 1.
Panel (b) shows the time evolution of the average distance between cooperators and
defectors calculated in the whole population for the same β values. Parameters are
v = 0.1, R = 1, and µ = 1.
To support our argument quantitatively, in Fig. 4 (a) we show how the average
distance dCD between cooperators and defectors in the neighborhoods evolves in time
for β = 0 and β = 1. We can observe that in the early stage the average distance
between neighboring cooperators and defectors gradually increases with time for β = 1.
In contrast, for β = 0 the same average distance remains practically unchanged in the
beginning and decays later. We note, however, that this late decay is just a simple
consequence of the fact that the population becomes homogeneous where only defectors
remain. In addition, in the intermediate state when both strategies are present the
average distance between neighboring cooperators and defectors is always higher for
β = 1 than that for β = 0.
For comparison we also show how the average distance dCD between cooperators and
defectors in the population evolves in time for β = 0 and β = 1, as presented in Fig. 4(b).
We can find that in the whole population the average distance of cooperator and defector
players remains unchanged at the early stage of evolution independently of the value of
β. But later this average distance gradually increases for β = 1, while it decreases for
β = 0. Furthermore, the mentioned critical distance for β = 1 always exceeds the same
value for β = 0. These results demonstrate that the motivation to escape away from
neighboring defectors can widen effectively the average distance between cooperators
and defectors: both in the neighborhoods and in the whole population. This effect,
however, is completely missing, when players are motivated to approach cooperator
neighbors. Hence, we can conclude that the evolution of cooperation can be better
promoted by escaping away from defectors than searching the vicinity of cooperators.
In the following, we present a simple model calculation to explain further the
paramount importance of above described average distance of competing strategies.
Accordingly, we consider two simplified mathematical models, which respectively
10
describe the motion among one cooperator and two defectors (Appendix A) and the
motion among two cooperators and one defector player (Appendix B).
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Figure 5. Panel (a) shows the average distance between cooperators and defectors
in the simplified motion model of one cooperator and two defectors as a function of
the initial value of h1 for β = 0 and β = 1. Panel (b) shows the average distance
between cooperators and defectors in the simplified motion model of one defector and
two cooperators as a function of the initial value of h1 for β = 0 and β = 1. Parameters:
v = 0.1, R = 1, and µ = 1.
These models allow us to obtain dynamical equations of motion for β = 0 and
β = 1 extreme cases (see Appendix A and B for more details). Here we define the
average distance between cooperators and defectors as dCD = (h1 + h2)/2, where h1 is
the distance between cooperator C (C1) and defector D1 (D) in Appendix A (B), and
h2 is the distance between cooperator C (C2) and defector D2 (D) in Appendix A (B).
By means of numerical calculations, we present the average distance dCD as a function
of the initial value h1(0) for β = 0 and β = 1 in these simplified models, as depicted
in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5 (a), we can find that the average distance dCD increases with the
initial value of h1 both for β = 0 and β = 1. But for each initial value of h1, the average
distance dCD for β = 1 is always higher than that for β = 0. In Fig. 5(b), we can find
that the average distance dCD increases with the initial value of h1 for β = 1, and the
average distance for β = 0 is always zero for each initial value of h1. Hence the former is
always higher than the latter for each initial value of h1. Indeed these motion patterns of
our simplified models can also appear in our model, and hence they clearly explain why
the distance between cooperators and defectors is widened when players are principally
motivated to leave defector neighbors and may be reduced when players are focusing to
approach cooperator neighbors. This difference, as we stressed, has a decisive factor on
the final evolutionary outcome.
In what follows, we study the influence of the strength µ of steric repulsive force
on the evolution of cooperation for different values of β. Our results are summarized
in Fig. 6 where we plot the fraction of cooperators in dependence on µ. We see that
the cooperation level can always be raised by increasing the value of µ especially at
11
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Figure 6. Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the strength of steric repulsive
force µ for different values of β as indicated in the legend. Parameters are v = 0.1
and R = 1. We note that random migration yields zero cooperation level at these
parameter values.
high β values. In the absence of relevant repulsive force at small µ values, however,
cooperators cannot survive. We note that in the random migration case the applied
parameter values would also result in a full defector state. These findings indicate that
the introduction of the steric repulsive force can promote the evolution of cooperation
under orientation-driven migration with high value β.
Finally, it remains of interest to explore how the threshold distance of interactions
R influences the evolution of cooperation for different values of β under the orientation-
driven migration protocol. As shown in Fig. 7, we observe that the cooperation level
always decreases if we increase the interaction range. This effect is specially pronounced
at small β values. Furthermore, when higher mobility speed is applied (not shown)
the decay of cooperation level is even more stressful. Notably, the cooperation level
for random migration is less than that for large β value. These findings support
that orientation-driven migration outperforms random migration for the evolution of
cooperation at large values of β and small values of R.
4. Discussion
In this work, we have proposed an orientation-driven migration approach into the
spatial public goods game and studied how it influences the evolution of cooperation.
Under the orientation-driven migration, each individual can adjust its motion direction
according to the motion directions of its neighbors. In principle, individuals prefer
to move closer to their neighboring cooperators or favor to escape away from their
neighboring defectors. Considering these two extreme driving forces into the orientation-
driven migration approach, in the framework of Monte Carlo simulations we have found
that the orientation-driven migration can strongly enhance the evolution of cooperation
when the speed of individuals is not too high. In particular, cooperation can be
12
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Figure 7. Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the threshold distance of
interaction range R for different values of β as indicated in the legend. Parameters are
v = 0.02 and µ = 1. We note that random migration would result in less cooperation
level at these parameter values, when compared with the case of large β value.
promoted when individuals are more inclined to evade defectors in their neighbors,
whereas cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more inclined
to move close to cooperators in their neighbors. Furthermore, compared with random
migration, escaping away from neighboring defectors for individuals can promote the
evolution of cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical
calculations, we further find that the key feature is the average distance of competing
strategies, hence escaping away from neighboring defectors can widen the average
distance between cooperator and defector individuals. This quantity has a paramount
importance, because its large value can effectively block the invasion of defectors into
cooperators and hence is favorable to the formation and expansion of cooperative clusters
for the evolution of cooperation. In addition, we have found that cooperation can be
more enhanced by high strength of steric repulsive force and low threshold distance of
interaction.
The importance of our observation is based on the fact that individual migration
is pervasive in living organisms, and has been considered into evolutionary game
models [27, 40–42]. It has been found that it can lead to the outbreak of cooperation.
In particular, when individual migration preferences are considered, moving away
unfavorable environment [41] and moving into profitable circumstance [27] can be
regarded as two significantly different migration modes for individuals. Previous works
have demonstrated that these options may both greatly promote the evolution of
cooperation [27, 41]. But if these two different driving forces for individual migration
are both considered into the same framework of spatial games, which mode of individual
migration can promote the evolution of cooperation more? Our work has clearly
answered this question, and we have found that cooperation can be best maintained
when individuals only choose to escape away from their neighboring defectors. On the
13
contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals only choose to
move close to their neighboring cooperators. Furthermore, we find that our proposed
orientation-driven migration approach can promote cooperation for low mobility, which
is similar to the finding in Ref. [40] that observed low mobility promotes cooperation
under random migration. However, compared with random migration studied in
Ref. [40], we find that escaping from neighboring defectors can better promote the
evolution of cooperation. Our work may thus unveil the evolution of cooperation
driven by different migration preferences, and we hope that this research will contribute
relevantly to our understanding of their role in determining the ultimate fate of the
mobile population.
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Appendix A. Simplified motion model of one cooperator and two defectors
In this paper, we consider a simplified motion model in which there are one cooperator
C and two defectors D1 and D2 , and aim to derive the dynamical equations in the
scenario where the weight function h(r) is a power-law function. To do that, we first
set the position and velocity of cooperator C as rC = (xC , yC) and v, respectively. And
we set the position and velocity of defector D1 as rD1 = (xD1 , yD1) and v1, respectively;
the position and velocity of defector D2 as rD2 = (xD2 , yD2) and v2, respectively.
Correspondingly, we have |v| = |v1| = |v2| = v. We further have vi = vVˆi and
v = vVˆ, where Vˆi and Vˆ are the unit vectors, and i = 1, 2. Furthermore, we denote
with h1 = rC − rD1 (h2 = rC − rD2) be the vector distance between cooperator (C)
and defector D1 (D2). Correspondingly, we have hi = hihˆi, where hˆi is the unit vector
and hi is the distance between cooperator C and defector Di. In addition, we have
hi = |hi| =
√
(xC − xDi)2 + (yC − yDi)2, where i = 1, 2.
A1.The case of β = 0
In this case, we assume that two defectors move towards cooperator C directly. Since
there are no other cooperators in the neighborhood of cooperator C, we consider that
cooperator C moves along with a fixed direction, which is the direction of v. For
simplicity, but without losing generality, we consider that the migration direction of
cooperator C is the positive direction of x-axis in the cartesian coordinate (see Fig. A1),
and correspondingly set the dynamical position of cooperator C as (vt, 0). Hence, we
have hi =
√
(vt− xDi)2 + y2Di .
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Figure A1. Two defectors D1 and D2 move close to cooperator C. θ1 (θ2) represents
the angle between the vector velocities of cooperator (C1) and defector D1 (D2).
Meanwhile, for defectors D1 and D2 the dynamical equations of motion can be
described as {
x˙Di = v cos θi,
y˙Di = v sin θi,
(A.1)
where θi (i = 1, 2) represents the angle between the vector velocities of cooperator
C and defector Di. For simplicity but without losing generality, we consider that
xD1(0) = −h1(0) cos θ1(0) and yD1(0) = −h1(0) sin θ1(0) for defector D1, and xD2(0) =
−h2(0) cos θ2 and yD2(0) = −h2(0) sin θ2(0) for defector D2.
In addition, we have tan θi =
−yDi
vt−xDi
. Accordingly, we have
tan2 θi =
y2Di
(vt− xDi)2
,
and
1
cos2 θi
= 1 +
y2Di
(vt− xDi)2
.
Considering that θi should be restricted between (0, pi/2) or (−pi/2, 0), thus we have
cos θi =
vt− xDi√
(vt− xDi)2 + y2Di
,
and
sin θi =
−yDi√
(vt− xDi)2 + y2Di
.
Hence, the dynamical equations of motion for defectors become
x˙Di =
v2t−vxDi√
(vt−xDi )2+y2Di
,
y˙Di =
−vyDi√
(vt−xDi )2+y2Di
.
(A.2)
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Figure A2. Individuals escape away from defectors in the situation in which there
are one cooperator and two defectors. θ represents the angle between the positive
x-axis and the vector velocity of cooperator C, and θi represents the angle between
the positive x-axis and the vector hi.
According to the above equations, we can further calculate the average distance dCD
between cooperator C and the two defectors D1, D2 for β = 0 in this simplified motion
model. To do that, we solve Eq. (A.2) via numerical integrations by using Runge-
Kutta method [63] with time step dt = 10−3. The initial conditions are h2(0) = 2,
−pi/2 < θ1(0) < 0, 0 < θ2(0) < pi/2, and 1 ≤ h1(0) ≤ 2. Then we can respectively
obtain the h1 and h2 values, and correspondingly have dCD = (h1+h2)/2. We emphasize
that for each initial value h1(0), we can obtain a dCD value for fixed θ1(0) and θ2(0)
values, and the average distance dCD for β = 0 in Fig. 5(a) is obtained by averaging over
all these distance values for uniformly distributed initial values θ1(0) between (−pi/2, 0)
and uniformly distributed initial values θ2(0) between (0, pi/2).
A2. The case of β = 1
In this case, we assume that defectors D1 and D2 will move with the opposite directions.
For simplicity but without losing generality, we assume that the migration direction of
defector D1 is the positive direction of y-axis, while the migration direction of defector
D2 is the negative direction of y-axis (see Fig. A2). We further set the positions of
two defectors as (0, y1 + vt) and (0, y2 − vt), respectively, where y1 and y2 respectively
represent the initial values of yD1 and yD2 . Hence we have y1 = −h1(0) sin θ1(0) and
y2 = −h2(0) sin θ2(0). For simplicity, we assume that initially cooperator C locates on
the positive x-axis. Correspondingly, we have xC(0) = h1(0) cos θ1(0) and yC(0) = 0.
For cooperator C, the dynamical equations of motion can be described as{
x˙C = v cos θ,
y˙C = v sin θ,
(A.3)
where θ represents the angle between the vector velocity of cooperator C and the positive
x-axis.
16
In addition, we have tan θi =
yC−yDi
xC
. We further have
1
cos2 θi
= 1 +
(yC − yDi)2
x2C
.
We consider that θi should be restricted between (0, pi/2) or (−pi/2, 0) and the
position of the cooperator xC ≥ 0, so we have
cos θi =
xC√
x2C + (yC − yDi)2
,
and
sin θi =
yC − yDi√
x2C + (yC − yDi)2
.
In addition, the direction of cooperator C is given by
Vˆ =
h−w1 hˆ1 + h
−w
2 hˆ2
|h−w1 hˆ1 + h−w2 hˆ2|
,
where V = h−w1 hˆ1 + h
−w
2 hˆ2. We further have
|V| =
√
h−2w1 + h
−2w
2 + 2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2 − θ1).
Using the definition of the inner product of vectors, we obtain cos(θ − θ1) = Vˆ · hˆ1 =
h−w1 +h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1)√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1)
,
cos(θ2 − θ) = Vˆ · hˆ2 = h
−w
2 +h
−w
1 cos(θ2−θ1)√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1)
.
As a result, we have cos θ =
h−w1 sin θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ2−h−w2 sin θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ2−θ1)
,
sin θ =
h−w1 cos θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ2−h−w2 cos θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ1−θ2)
.
Hence, the dynamical equations of the motion for cooperator C are given as x˙C = v
h−w1 sin θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ2−h−w2 sin θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ2−θ1)
,
y˙C = v
h−w1 cos θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ2−h−w2 cos θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ1−θ2)
,
(A.4)
where h1 =
√
x2C + (yC − y1 − vt)2, h2 =
√
x2C + (yC − y2 + vt)2, cos θi =
xC√
x2C+(yC−yDi )2
, and sin θi =
yC−yDi√
x2C+(yC−yDi )2
.
According to the above equations, we can further calculate the average distance
dCD between cooperator C and two defectors D1, D2 for β = 1 in this simplified motion
model. To do that, we solve Eq. (A.4) via numerical integrations by using Runge-Kutta
method [63] with time step dt = 10−3. Here the initial conditions are h2(0) = 2, w = 2,
−pi/2 < θ1(0) < 0, 0 < θ2(0) < pi/2, and 1 ≤ h1(0) ≤ 2. Then we can respectively
obtain the h1 and h2 values and calculate dCD = (h1 + h2)/2. We emphasize that
for each initial value h1(0), we can obtain a dCD value for fixed θ1(0) value, and the
average distance dCD for β = 1, plotted in Fig. 5(a), is obtained by averaging over all
these distance values for uniformly distributed initial values θ1(0) between (−pi/2, 0)
and uniformly distributed initial values θ2(0) between (0, pi/2).
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Figure B1. Individuals move close to cooperators in the situation in which there are
two cooperators and one defector. θ represents the angle between the positive x-axis
and the vector velocity of defector D, and θi represents the angle between the positive
x-axis and the vector hi.
Appendix B. Simplified motion model of one defector and two cooperators
In the following, we consider a simplified motion model in which there are a defector
(D) and two cooperators C1 and C2, and then derive the dynamical equations in the
scenario where the weight function h(r) is a power-law function. To do that, we first set
the position and velocity of defector D as rD = (xD, yD) and v, respectively. And we
set the position and velocity of cooperator C1 as rC1 = (xC1 , yC1) and v1, respectively;
the position and velocity of cooperator C2 as rC2 = (xC2 , yC2) and v2, respectively.
Correspondingly, we have |v| = |v1| = |v2| = v. We further have vi = −vVˆi and
v = −vVˆ, where Vˆi and Vˆ are the unit vectors, and i = 1, 2. Furthermore, we
denote by h1 = rD − rC1 (h2 = rD − rC2) the distance vector of cooperator C1 (C2)
and defector D. Correspondingly, we have hi = hihˆi, where hˆi is the unit vector
and hi is the distance between defector D and cooperator Ci. In addition, we have
hi =
√
(xD − xCi)2 + (yD − yCi)2, where i = 1, 2.
B1.The case of β = 0
In this case, we assume that cooperators C1 and C2 will move towards to each other.
For simplicity without losing generality, we assume that the migration direction of
cooperator C1 is the negative direction of y-axis, while the migration direction of
cooperator C2 is the positive direction of y-axis (see Fig. B1). We further set the
positions of two cooperators as (0, y1 − vt) and (0, y2 + vt), respectively. Hence we
have y1 = −h1(0) sin θ1(0) and y2 = −h2(0) sin θ2(0). For simplicity but without
losing generality, we assume that initially defector D locates on the positive x-axis.
Correspondingly, we have xD(0) = h1(0) cos θ1(0) and yD(0) = 0.
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For defector D, the dynamical equations of motion can be thus described as{
x˙D = v cos θ,
y˙D = v sin θ,
(B.1)
where θ represents the angle between the vector velocity of cooperator C and the positive
x-axis.
In addition, we have tan θi =
yD−yCi
xD
. We further have
1
cos2 θi
= 1 +
(yD − yCi)2
x2D
.
We consider that when defector (D) moves close to the origin (O), the direction of
defector (D) becomes the negative or positive direction of y-axis, so we have xD ≥ 0.
Considering that θi should be restricted between (0, pi/2) or (−pi/2, 0), thus we have
cos θi =
xD√
x2D + (yD − yCi)2
,
and
sin θi =
yD − yCi√
x2D + (yD − yCi)2
.
In addition, the direction of defector D is given by
vˆ = − h
−w
1 hˆ1 + h
−w
2 hˆ2
|h−w1 hˆ1 + h−w2 hˆ2|
.
where V = −h−w1 hˆ1 − h−w2 hˆ2. We further have
|V| =
√
h−2w1 + h
−2w
2 + 2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2 − θ1).
Using the definition of the inner product of vectors, we obtain cos(θ1 − θ) = Vˆ · hˆ1 = −
h−w1 +h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1)√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1)
,
cos(θ2 − θ) = Vˆ · hˆ2 = − h
−w
2 +h
−w
1 cos(θ2−θ1)√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1)
.
As a result, we have cos θ = −
h−w1 sin θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ2−h−w2 sin θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ2−θ1)
,
sin θ = −h−w1 cos θ2+h−w2 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ2−h−w2 cos θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ1−θ2)
.
Hence, the dynamical equations of the motion for defector D are given by x˙D = −v
h−w1 sin θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ2−h−w2 sin θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) sin θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ2−θ1)
,
y˙D = −v h
−w
1 cos θ2+h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ2−h−w2 cos θ1−h−w1 cos(θ2−θ1) cos θ1√
h−2w1 +h
−2w
2 +2h
−w
1 h
−w
2 cos(θ2−θ1) sin(θ1−θ2)
.
(B.2)
where h1 =
√
x2D + (yD − y1 + vt)2, h2 =
√
x2D + (yD − y2 − vt)2, cos θi =
xD√
x2D+(yD−yCi )2
(i = 1, 2), and sin θi =
yD−yCi√
x2D+(yD−yCi )2
.
According to the above equations, we can further calculate the average distance
dCD between cooperators C1, C2 and defector D for β = 0 in this simplified motion
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Figure B2. Two cooperators escape away from one defector. θ1 (θ2) represents the
angle between the vector velocities of defector D and cooperator C1 (C2).
model. To do that, we solve Eq. (B.2) via numerical integrations by using Runge-Kutta
method [63] with time step dt = 10−3. The initial conditions are h2(0) = 2, w = 2,
−pi/2 < θ1(0) < 0, 0 < θ2(0) < pi/2, and 1 ≤ h1(0) ≤ 2. Then we can respectively
obtain the h1 and h2 values, and correspondingly the critical distance dCD = (h1+h2)/2.
We emphasize that for each initial value h1(0), we can obtain a dCD value for fixed θ1(0)
value, and the average distance dCD for β = 0 in Fig. 5(b) is obtained by averaging over
all these distance values for uniformly distributed initial values θ1(0) between (−pi/2, 0)
and uniformly distributed initial values θ2(0) between (0, pi/2).
B2. The case of β = 1
In this case, we know that two cooperators escape away from defector D. Since there
are no other defector in the neighborhood of defector D, we consider that defector
D moves along with a fixed direction, which is the direction of v. For simplicity,
we consider that the migration direction of defector D is the positive direction of x-
axis in the cartesian coordinate (see Fig. B2), and correspondingly set the dynamical
position of defector D as (vt, 0). Hence we have hi =
√
(vt− xCi)2 + y2Ci . We consider
that xC1(0) = h1(0) cos θ1(0) and yC1(0) = h1(0) sin θ1(0) for cooperator C1, and
xC2(0) = h2(0) cos θ2 and yC2(0) = h2(0) sin θ2(0) for cooperator C2.
Meanwhile, for cooperators C1 and C2 the dynamical equations of motion can be
described as {
x˙Ci = v cos θi,
y˙Ci = v sin θi,
(B.3)
where θi(i = 1, 2) represent the angle between the vector velocities of defector D and
cooperator Ci.
In addition, we have tan θi =
yCi
xCi−vt
. Accordingly, we have
tan2 θi =
y2Ci
(xCi − vt)2
,
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and
1
cos2 θi
= 1 +
y2Ci
(xCi − vt)2
.
Considering that θi should be restricted between (0, pi/2) or (−pi/2, 0), thus we have
cos θi =
xCi − vt√
(xCi − vt)2 + y2Ci
,
and
sin θi =
yCi√
(xCi − vt)2 + y2Ci
.
Hence, the dynamical equations of motion for two cooperators become
x˙Ci =
vxCi−v2t√
(xCi−vt)2+y2Ci
,
y˙Ci =
vyCi√
(xCi−vt)2+y2Ci
.
(B.4)
According to these equations, we can further calculate the average distance dCD
between cooperators C1, C2 and defector D for β = 1 in this simplified motion model. To
do that, we solve Eq. (B.4) via numerical integrations by using Runge-Kutta method [63]
with time step dt = 10−3. The initial conditions are h2(0) = 2, 0 < θ1(0) < pi/2,
−pi/2 < θ2(0) < 0, and 1 ≤ h1(0) ≤ 2. Then we can respectively obtain the h1 and h2
values, and correspondingly have dCD = (h1 +h2)/2. We emphasize that for each initial
value h1(0), we can obtain a dCD value for fixed θ1(0) and θ2(0) values, and the average
distance dCD for β = 1 in Fig. 5(b) is obtained by averaging over all these distance values
for uniformly distributed initial values θ1(0) between (0, pi/2) and uniformly distributed
initial values θ2(0) between (−pi/2, 0).
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